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Abst ract  
Managing st rategic cont radict ion and paradoxical situat ions has been gaining 
im portance in technological, innovat ion and m anagem ent  dom ains. As a result , m ore 
and m ore paradoxical instances and types have been docum ented in literature. The 
innovators dilem m a is such an instance that  gives a detailed descript ion of how 
disrupt ive innovat ions affect  firm s. However, the innovators dilem m a has only been 
applied to large organisat ions and m ore specifically indust ry incum bents. Through a 
m ult iple case study of six eLearning SME’s, this paper invest igates the applicabilit y of 
the innovators dilem m a as well as the disrupt ive effects of Web 2.0 on the 
organisat ions. Analysing the data collected over 18 m onths, it  was found that  the 
innovators dilem m a did indeed apply to SME’s. However, inline with the original 
thesis the dilem m a only applied to the SME’s established (pre-2002)  before the 
developm ent  of Web 2.0 technologies began. Furtherm ore, the study highlights that  
the post -2002 firm s were also part ly vulnerable to the dilem m a but  were able to 
avoid any negat ive effects though technological visionary leadership. I n cont rast ,  the 
pre-2002 firm s were lacking this visionary abilit y and were also const rained by low 
risk profiles. 
Literature 
I nt roduct ion 
   I ncreased technological change and global com pet it ion have required a need for  
m anagers to incorporate and integrate paradoxical thinking into their m ethodologies 
(Lewis, 2000) .  For instance, in the early 1990’s IS researchers were drawn towards 
the product ivit y paradox, t rying to understand the im pact  of inform at ion technology 
on organisat ions (Brynjolfsson, 1993) . During the sam e period a num ber of wider 
organisat ional paradoxes were also ident ified. These included:  the “basic unresolved 
problem ”  (Levinthal and March, 1993)  the “com petency t rap”  (Henderson and Clark, 
1990)  and “success syndrom e” (Tushm an and O' Reilly, 1996) . The underlying them e 
in each of these studies highlights the need for IS and business m anagers alike to 
fully understand the possible paradoxical effects of their act ions, especially if their 
act ions are viewed as best  pract ice by the wider com m unity (Henderson and Clark, 
1990;  Tushm an and O' Reilly, 1996) . From  this research, a num ber of fram eworks 
have been developed to help organisat ions deal with the com plexity of paradoxes 
(Lewis, 2000) . I n part icular, the “innovators dilem m a” is one such fram ework that  
focuses on a very specific paradox within the innovat ion dom ain (Christensen and 
Bower, 1996;  Christensen, 1997) .   
I nnovat ion 
   The study of innovat ion has evolved as a m ult idisciplinary endeavour with 
num erous innovat ion types and definit ions exist ing across m any studies (Et t lie et  al. ,  
1984;  Garcia and Calantone, 2002) . The idea that  there are different  form s of 
innovat ion with different  com pet it ive effects was first  raised by Schum peter (1942)  
through his not ion of “creat ive dest ruct ion”. Later t erm ed as Schum ptererian rents, 
Schum peter described how value was appropriated from  risky init iat ives and 
ent repreneurial insights in uncertain and com plex environm ents, which are subject  to 
self-dest ruct ion as knowledge diffuses (Schum peter, 1934) . Following on from  
Schum peter, the literature characterised different  kinds of innovat ion based on their 
im pact  on the established capabilit ies of an organisat ion (Henderson and Clark, 
1990) . Disrupt ive innovat ion is one such form  that  has drawn the at tent ion of both 
academ ics and pract it ioners alike, as being im portant  in the long- term  survival of an 
organisat ion (Linton, 2002;  Danneels, 2004) . Sim ilar to what  was term ed as 
“Schum pterian shocks” (Barney, 1991) , a disrupt ive change is one that  changes the 
bases of com pet it ion by altering the perform ance m et rics on which firm s com pete 
(Danneels, 2004) . I nit ially, the disrupt ive nature of innovat ions was very loosely 
defined but  it  was later refined by Danneels (2004) . He stated that  a disrupt ive 
change was one that  changes the bases of com pet it ion by altering the perform ance 
m et rics on which firm s com pete. Moreover, research in the dom ain, such as:  the 
phases of evolut ion of disrupt ive technologies  (Myers et  al. ,  2002) , predict ive 
m odels of disrupt ive innovat ion m arket  diffusion (Linton, 2002) , the definit ion of 
disrupt ive innovat ion and disrupt ive technologies (Danneels, 2004;  Markides, 2006) , 
have all added to the academ ic understanding and debate within the area.  
 
ELearning and disrupt ive innovat ion 
   An exam ple of the disrupt ive effects of innovat ion can be clearly seen in the 
eLearning indust ry. I n 2006 a report  highlighted that  the indust ry was experiencing 
the disrupt ive im pact  of Web2.0 with the developm ent  of eLearning 2.0 (TerKeurst  et  
al. ,  2006) . The term  Web 2.0, which refers to the use of the internet  to increase 
creat ivit y, inform at ion sharing and collaborat ion between users, was officially coined 
in 2005 by O’Reilly. These concepts have led to the developm ent  and evolut ion of 
web-based com m unit ies and hosted services using plat form s such as:  social-
networking sites, wikis, blogs, and folksonom ies (O' Reilly, 2005) . As an indicat ion of 
how fast  Web 2.0 was gaining t ract ion in the IT indust ry, Facebook (a social network 
plat form )  was valued at  $100 m illion after a m ere 18 m onths of operat ion 
(Eisenm ann and Feinstein, 2008) .  
 
   The first  of three findings from  the 2006 eLearning report  found Web2.0 to be at  
the core of m any developm ents in eLearning. I n addit ion, it  est im ated that  80%  of 
learning is done inform ally com pared to 20%  of form al and st ructured learning 
(TerKeurst  et  al. ,  2006) . The later defining learning through defined courses or 
pedagogically defined m ethods, with the form er defining learning through inform al 
set t ings, conversat ions with peers or pedagogically undefined events (Cross, 2007) . 
The potent ial for  the web 2.0 technologies was thus seen support ing this new m ode 
of eLearning as it  m oved from  the dist r ibut ion of form al content  to a m ore learner 
cent r ic environm ent  (TerKeurst  et  al. ,  2006) . Exam ples of the effects of Web 2.0 on 
the wider eLearning indust ry are quite visible. I n 2005, Wikipedia passed 750,000 
art icles (Wikipedia, 2008) . Even though it  has received m ixed reviews, it s popularit y 
and abilit y to dem ocrat ise inform at ion is quite unique (Korfiat is et  al. ,  2006) .  
Furtherm ore, that  year the “OpenCourseWare Consort ium ” was form ed. The 
OpenCourseWare Consort ium  now consists of m ore than 200 higher educat ion 
inst itut ions and associated organisat ions from  around the world. The prim ary aim  of 
the consort ium  is to create a broad and deep body of open educat ional content  using 
a free-sharing m odel. The possible effect  of this is st r iking when Massachuset ts 
I nst itute of Technology (MIT)  openly admit  that  it  costs them  between $10,000 -  
$30,000 to publish a course through OpenCourseWare and in total costs $4 m illion a 
year to support  the init iat ive.(OCW, 2008) . I n addit ion, Web 2.0 technologies have 
been supported by the r ise of m obile and ubiquitous com put ing, which further 
disrupts the eLearning indust ry (Hall and Bannon, 2006;  Clough et  al. ,  2008) . 
 
I nnovators Dilem m a 
   From  a paradoxical perspect ive the innovators dilem m a further adds to the dom ain 
of disrupt ive innovat ion. I n essence, the innovators dilem m a highlights the 
vulnerabilit y of large indust ry incum bents when faced with a disrupt ive innovat ion in 
the form  of a disrupt ive technology. An issue docum ented by m any authors 
(McDerm ot t  and O’Connor, 2002) , Christensen posits that  the prim ary cause for the 
vulnerabilit y lies in st rong m anagem ent  paradigm s that  direct  organisat ions to 
blindly focus on their current  custom ers while ignoring innovat ions or technologies 
that  appear inferior with potent ially low financial returns (Christensen, 1997;  
Christensen and Raynor, 2003;  Tellis, 2006) . The dilem m a then arises when the 
technology quickly outperform s current  technologies leaving the large indust ry 
incum bents at  a com pet it ive disadvantage with a st rong r isk of loosing their current  
custom ers (Christensen, 1997) . 
 
   Giving such exam ples of the m echanical excavator and hard disk drive indust ry,  
Christensen dem onst rated how m anagers ignored new technologies which were 
econom ically unfeasible but  later went  on to becom e the underlying technologies of 
their m arkets. He found that  organisat ions with technological leadership in an 
indust ry, tended to fall into the t rap of aggressively pursuing high returns on 
innovat ions. This t rap is indicat ive of the rule of thum b for only choosing product  line 
extensions that  prom ise to yield a higher net  price (Calthrop, 2007) . The fear is that  
if organisat ions do not  follow this rule they m ay find them selves in the sam e 
situat ion as Hoover. Dyson entered the US m arket  when Hoover was “innovat ing 
downward with sim pler,  cheaper products, reducing prices so that  it  could m aintain 
it s share of unit  sales”. Consequent ly Dyson gained the dollar share of t he US m arket  
(Calthrop, 2007) . However, avoiding a sim ilar fate as befell Hoover by pursuing a 
long- term  st rategy of im proving an exist ing product  t o further fulfil custom er 
requirem ents, does not  guarantee success. Such a course of act ion m ay lead to a 
situat ion wherein when the im proved product  is superseded by another t echnology, 
the organisat ion is unable to respond. The dilem m a which lies in developing 
com pet ing technologies at  a t im e when the dom inant  m arket  technology is current ly 
and successfully em ployed by an organisat ion is a cont radict ion in m anagerial term s. 
This paradox is further defined through the five principles of the innovators dilem m a, 
which have been further ut ilized in researching the phenom enon (Dhillion et  al. ,  
2001) . The principles explicit ly specify key characterist ics of a disrupt ive 
technological shift  that  cause large organisat ions to fail,  which include:  
 
   Which explicit ly specified key characterist ics of a disrupt ive technological shift  
cause large organisat ions to fail? These principles include:  
1. Com panies depend on custom ers and investors for  resources 
2. Sm all m arkets don’t  solve the growth needs of large com panies 
3.  Markets that  don’t  exist  can’t  be analysed 
4.  An organisat ion’s capabilit ies define it s disabilit ies 
5.  Technology supply m ay not  equal m arket  dem and 
 
   Even though the theory has been supported by a num ber of authors such as Nault  
and Vandenbosch (2000) , it  has also had it s crit ics (Danneels, 2004;  Markides, 
2006;  Tellis, 2006) . However, each of the crit iques highlighted the com plexity of the 
dom ain and the posit ive effect  that  research has m ade to the area. For instance, 
Danneels (2004)  out lined a num ber of pit falls in the theory ( eg it s ineffect ive 
predict ive nature)  but  also highlighted it s ability to “offer a really int ricate picture of 
how firm s react  t o t echnological shift s” and added to the theory by m ore t ight ly 
defining a disrupt ive innovat ion. Markides (2006)  posited the need for a refined 
definit ion of disrupt ive innovat ions ( to include ( i)  technologies, ( ii)  business m odels, 
and ( iii)  processes) , but  also stated that  these three sub-categories m ay have the 
sam e effect  on m arkets as out lined by Christensen. Finally, Tellis (2006)  noted that  
the success and failure of an organisat ion is not  determ ined by external im pacts such 
as disrupt ive technologies, but  by internal factors such as the culture of the firm . 
However, Christensen’s theory does weigh heavily on the internal aspects of the firm  
as one of his key findings is that  good m anagem ent  techniques are paradoxically the 
source of vulnerabilit y and inert ia in the face of disrupt ive innovat ions. As already 
out lined, the innovators dilem m a specifically deals with large organisat ions with 
specific em phasis on incum bents. Nonetheless, the quest ion arises;  does the 
innovators dilem m a also apply to other types of organisat ions? So far t he debate has 
revolved around defining the different  aspects of the theory with a dist inct  absence 
of research outside of these param eters. To this end the research quest ion posited 
by this paper states:  
 
RQ:  Within the context  of t he eLearning indust ry, does the innovators dilem m a 
apply to organisat ions other than large indust ry incum bents? 
Research Method 
   The prim ary data of the study is collected through a m ult iple case study approach 
incorporat ing six eLearning organisat ions operat ing in I reland. The study was 
categorised as exploratory due to the scarcity of em pirical work in the area, the 
focus on discovery, and the aim  of theory building. A num ber of authors have 
proposed that  case studies const itute a suitable research m ethodology for 
exploratory research of this kind (Yin, 1984;  Marshall and Rossm an, 1989) . The 
researchers also decided that  a m ult iple case study would be the m ost  appropriate 
m ethod for this study as it  would facilitate the collect ion of data from  a larger 
num ber of organisat ions, and would form  the basis for m ore focused research at  a 
later stage. Moreover, case studies allow the study of phenom ena in their proper 
contexts.  
 
   Highlight ing the relevant  context  of the study, each of the organisat ions in the 
m ult iple case study were a part  of an innovat ion network funded by Enterprise 
I reland. Having ident ified eLearning as a high potent ial sector within the I r ish 
econom y (Forfás, 2002) , Enterprise I reland, a governm ent  body for  support ing 
indigenous start -ups and SME’s enabled an exist ing network of eLearning firm s to 
gain access to substant ial R&D resources. Each of the organisat ions in the study fell 
under the SME categorisat ion. Ranging in size from  under 10 em ployees to between 
100 and 150 em ployees, the SME’s had also revenues of up to ¼PLOOLRQDURXQG
that  period. I n addit ion, all of the organisat ions were prim arily involved in the 
eLearning indust ry on a European and/ or global basis and had been in existence 
between 2 and 20 years. 
 
   I n 2006 and with the support  of ¼ PLOOLRQ LQ IXQGLQJ WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQV
developed an innovat ion partnership with a third level inst itut ion, which specialised 
in Web 2.0 and sem ant ic technologies. As a m em ber of the third level inst itut ion the 
researcher was able to collect  prim ary data over the first  18 m onths of innovat ion 
network, in which the eLearning SME’s faced the technological disrupt ion of Web 2.0. 
I n all over 70 hours of prim ary data was collected from  m ult iple sources and m ult iple 
inform ants using interviews and part icipant  observat ion. Data was gathered from  
each of the eLearning organisat ions as well as the third level inst itut ion and 
Enterprise I reland. I n t otal, 7 interviews were undertaken, which lasted between 45 
– 90 m inutes and were all sem i-st ructured. Part icipant  observat ion was used 
throughout  the 18 m onths and data was also gained from  inter-organisat ional 
m eet ings and open days. Even though the m eet ings were not  as form alised as 
interviews, the researcher was able to collect  required data by asking quest ions or 
not ing points of inform at ion that  addressed the quest ions asked in previous 
interviews. Furtherm ore, on m ore than one occasion, m eet ings were conducted over 
a full business day. This gave the researcher t im e to talk freely with com pany 
em ployees and collect  data in an unst ructured m anner that  aligned with the research 
object ives of the study. Open days also consisted of one to two day events where all 
of the organisat ions in the innovat ion network were invited to one locat ion to discuss 
current  issues and topics associated with the network. Finally, analysis of 
com pany/ indust ry reports and press releases that  applied to period and 
organisat ions in quest ion were also used to t r iangulate data used in the study. This 
data was then analysed through m eta-m at rices st ructured by the pr inciples of the 
innovators dilem m a.  This enabled cross case com parisons as well as ident ificat ion of 
com m on them es within the study.  
 
Findings 
   Analysing the data gathered in the study, it  becam e apparent  that  within the six 
organisat ions, two categories of firm s existed. The first  category, which was m ade up 
of the four firm s (Com panies A, B, C, D)  established pre-2002 (before the beginning 
of Web 2.0)  had done lit t le to analyse, understand or deal with the technological shift  
in the indust ry. For instance the CTO of Com pany D saw very lit t le change in the 
eLearning indust ry stat ing that  “courseware was m uch the sam e as it  was 20 years 
ago”.  
 
   Further evidence indicat ive of the inert ia which the pre-2002 firm s were 
experiencing was collected during an interview with a CTO of Com pany A. During this 
interview the CTO stated that  “we (Com pany A)  don’t  have system s that  are in any 
way sym pathet ic t o where the web is. We are as m uch about  Web1.0, big system  in 
the sky with content .  The content  is m ult im edia and very engaging but  there is no 
com m unity, there is no collaborat ion, no sharing of content , in short , there is no 
Web2.0”.  
 
   I n cont rast , the second category of organisat ions was m ade up of the two 
organisat ions that  were established post -2002 and around the t im e that  Web 2.0 
technologies began to develop (Com panies E and F) . Taking the disrupt ive effects of 
ubiquitous com put ing as an underlying driver of the Web 2.0 technological shift  in 
the eLearning indust ry,  Com pany F had developed a product  that  would posit ion 
them  as an enabler of m obile eLearning by leveraging exist ing LMS resources. 
Com pany E, the organisat ion that  m ade up the rest  of the post -2002 category 
cont inued to use the advances in software and content  delivery to their advantage. 
As an indicat ion of how they were using Web2.0 to their advantage, t he CTO stated 
that  their biggest  object ive (early 2006)  was to “create a com m unity around” their 
product . This dichotom ous classificat ion of the pre and post -2002 firm s is in line with 
Christensen and Bower ’s (1996)  categorisat ion of exist ing and ent rant  organisat ions. 
I n addit ion, the init ial analysis is also in line with the thesis. However, to further  
explore the research quest ion and determ ine whether the innovators dilem m a 
applies to SME’s, each of the firm s are invest igated in m ore detail using the five 
principles set  out  by Christensen.  
  
Principle # 1 : Com panies depend on custom ers and investors for  resources 
   Evidence taken from  each of the pre-2002 firm s depicted in Table 1, explicit ly 
dem onst rates their over dependence on current  custom ers for resources and 
innovat ion direct ion. All innovat ion effort s were prim arily focused on get t ing ext ra 
value from  current  custom ers. For instance, the COO of Com pany A stated that  they 
would rather gain m ore revenue off exist ing custom ers then look for new custom ers. 
I n addit ion, in- line with the Theory of resource dependence from  which this principle 
is based, the CEO of Com pany C highlighted that  it  is custom ers that  cont rol what  
type of t echnology an organizat ion explores. Moreover,  evidence from  Com pany D 
illust rated that  the process of explorat ion only went  as far as the current  custom ers 
of the organisat ion. Furtherm ore, evidence from  a senior m em ber in Enterprise 
I reland suggested that  innovat ion init iat ives that  did not  intend to generate revenue 
from  their current  custom ers within the short - to-m edium  term  m eant  too m uch high 
r isk for the eLearning SME’s to m anage. This lim itat ion in- turn put  a big rest r ict ion 
on their abilit y to look beyond their exist ing m arket  or exist ing custom ers. I n 
cont rast , the post -2002 firm s were in process of building a custom er base and were 
not  st rongly dependent  on exist ing custom ers. I n addit ion, input  from  custom ers in 
the developm ent  of their products was m inim al. Moreover, during an interview the 
COO of one of the post -2002 firm s stated the input  that  was received was not  of 
great  use as “ they (custom ers)  haven’t  seen it  before” .  
Table 1 : Data dem onstrat ing the dependence on custom ers for resources 
Quote I nterviewee Com pany  
"Rather than worry about  solving a new problem  for a 
new client . I  m uch rather double the am ount  of m oney 
each client  pays m e every year then going out  to find 
the sam e num ber custom ers paying m e the sam e 
am ount  every year"   COO 
Com pany A 
Pre-2002 
Talking about  the next  generat ion of custom er and user 
of eLearning it  was highlighted “ that  they are geared to 
think” . The CTO added “ yes but  this generat ion pays the 
cheque” . CTO 
Com pany B 
Pre-2002 
“clients push the technology in a very t ight  m arket ”  CEO 
Com pany C 
Pre-2002 
“We typically start  off by researching the m arket  or 
from  dem and from  clients. As for the financial sector 
there m aybe a new derivat ive product  on the m arket  
and a client  m ight  need”  COO 
Com pany D 
Pre-2002 
“ I n term s in overall product  direct ion, probably not  an 
awful lot  at  the m om ent  as it  is ahead of the curve, they 
haven’t  seen it  before”  COO 




Principle # 2 : Sm all m arkets don’t  solve the grow th needs of large 
com panies 
   With part icular em phasis on eLearning 2.0 and m obile Learning, Table 2 highlights 
that  the pre-2002 firm s felt  the m arkets were too sm all for them . For instance, 
Com pany C felt  that  the potent ial m arket  const ituted of “geeks” alone. These could 
be viewed as early adopters and as potent ial lead users. However, the pre-2002 
firm s viewed this type of m arket  as low dem and and low value, which highlights a 
lack of vision. Dem onst rat ing this point , the CTO of Com pany D felt  that  this new 
type of eLearning 2.0 could be com pared to “dum pster diving”. The m arkets were 
also sm all for the post -2002 firm s but  as they were in the early growth stages of 
organisat ional developm ent . There was a suff icient ly large enough m arket  for them  
to survive. I n the case of Com pany E, they used venture capital to cover any 
short falls due to the lack of dem and from  the em erging m arkets. 
 
Table 2 : Data dem onstrat ing the applicability of pr inciple tw o to the SME’s 
Quote I nterviewee Com pany 
“all you have is  the geeks that  love blogging and write 
all the t im e”  CTO 
Com pany C 
Pre-2002 
“we have to develop ourselves to m ake it  norm al to 
read an em ail off a blackberry. People are only com ing 
to that  and there is not  that  m uch dem and for  it .”   CTO 
Com pany C 
Pre-2002 
“dum pster diving” CTO 
Com pany D 
Pre-2002 
“we have com e from  start -up stage to init ial growth 
stage” COO 




Principle # 3 : Markets that  don’t  ex ist  can’t  be  analysed 
   I ndicat ive of the organisat ions in it s category, Com pany A prim arily did m arket  
analysis on their current  custom ers (as highlighted in Table 4) . I n addit ion, the 
m ajorit y of the data analysed points to the fact  that  very lit t le m arket  analysis was 
carried out  beyond the scope of their m arket  segm ents. I n fact  there is evidence to 
suggest  that  the organisat ions felt  that  t rying to analyse future m arkets was of no 
benefit . The clearest  indicat ion of this fut ilit y experienced by organisat ions was given 
by a partner of Com pany B during a m eet ing. The partner felt  that  an organisat ion 
should not  look too m uch far ahead as the potent ial for generat ing revenue is 
prim arily in the short - term  future.  The partner states that  analysis only works when 
you go “one and a half steps ahead” com pared to “ t en and a half steps ahead”.  
Moreover, the quote from  Com pany C indicates that  the organisat ion did not  have 
the abilit y to envision a future for technologies (such as m obile com put ing)  within 
eLearning. This is in cont rast  t o Com pany F of the post -2002 firm s who saw big 
potent ial in the technology and developed a project  around it . I n addit ion, both of 
the post -2002 firm s had quite clear visions of the future of the eLearning indust ry. 
As already m ent ioned, Com pany F viewed m obile com put ing to be a big driver within 
the indust ry, whereas Com pany E saw the indust ry being disrupt ive by Web 2.0. 
Furtherm ore, it  was not  j ust  Web 2.0 social networking but  “social networking in an 
Enterprise sense”  (COO, Com pany E) .  What  this shows is that  t he post -2002 
organisat ions faced the sam e hurdles in analysing the future eLearning m arkets, but  
were bet ter able to create a clear vision around where their organisat ion could ut ilise 
the potent ial of new technologies.  
 
Table 3:  Data dem onst rat ing difficult ies experienced by 
the organisat ions in analysing new m arketsQuote I nterviewee Com pany 
“My m anagem ent  team  spends a lot  of t im e in the field 
and detects a pat tern in the m arket  place and says 
som ething like our custom er base could do with 
som ething that  does this.” COO 
Com pany A 
Pre-2002 
“I  have lived m y life ten and a half steps ahead of the 
m arket , what  I  have learned is to m ake m oney you 
can only be one and a half steps ahead”  Partner 
Com pany B 
Pre-2002 
“A lot  of people are talking about  m - learning or 
learning on PDA’s. I  don’t  see it  happening yet , I  st ill 
think there is t oo m uch to do for a person to do a 
course on their PDA”.  CTO 
Com pany C 
Pre-2002 
“social networking in an Enterprise sense”  COO 
Com pany E 
Post -2002 
 
Principle # 4 : An organisat ion’s capabilit ies defines its disabilit ies 
   Throughout  the 18 m onth study it  was found that  the core com petence of the pre-
2002 organisat ions lay in fulfilling the regulatory/ com pliance needs of their 
custom ers by producing eLearning courses. I n addit ion, as the data (see Table 4)  
dem onst rates, the m ain capabilit ies of these firm s leaned m ore towards custom er 
relat ionship m anagem ent  than technological expert ise. For instance the COO from  
Com pany A explicit ly stated that  their core com petence was their Sales departm ent .  
The CEO of Com pany D also noted that  in the com pet it ive m arket  of eLearning, their 
organisat ion st rength lay in knowing their m arket . However, the st rongest  evidence 
of the shift  away from  a technological em phasis can be found in Com pany C, where 
the CEO adm it ted that  he consistent ly chose short - term  revenue opportunit ies over 
technological R&D investm ent . I n cont rast , both of the post -2002 firm s were not  t ied 
to the com pliance/ regulat ion m arket . Furtherm ore, they both believed that  the 
com pliance/ regulat ion m arket  was at  the low end of the value scale. I n addit ion, 
their capabilit ies were st rongest  on the technological aspect  and as a result  they 
found it  easier to take advantage of the new technological t rends em erging. As a 
result  their exist ing capabilit ies did not  t ie them  to specific m arkets or specific 
technologies. 
 
Table 4 : Data dem onstrat ing the different  im pacts of the pre  and post - 2 0 0 2  
firm ’s capabilit ies. 
Quote I nterviewee Com pany 
“I ts not  the custom isabilit y of our products but  the fact  
that  we can produce a custom  built  product  for  
whatever the need is.” CTO 
Com pany C 
Pre-2002 
Asked what  is the core com petence of the f irm  the 
COO  “I ’m  always going to say sales” COO 
Com pany A 
Pre-2002 
“We are very good at  keeping a close eye on our niche 
and knowing our custom ers” CEO 
Com pany D 
Pre-2002 
“The CTO has always shown the need for an R&D 
departm ent  but  I  always say that  we need to m ake 
m oney” (CEO)  CEO/ CTO 
Com pany C 
Pre-2002 
“value in cert ificat ion. Cert ificat ion as it  is now is 
nothing but  a set  of m ult iple choice quest ions”.  COO 
Com pany E 
Post -2002 
“Com pliance has driven eLearning but  that  is not  
where the future of the indust ry lies” CTO 
Com pany F 
Post -2002 
 
Principle # 5 : Technology supply m ay not  equal m arket  dem and 
   There is st rong evidence that  suggests that  both the current  and new technologies 
within the indust ry were overshoot ing the need of the organisat ions custom ers of 
both the pre and post -2002 firm s. Furtherm ore, table 5 illust rates that  the pre-2002 
firm s were st ruggling to balance the technological oversupply within their current  
products with the weak dem and for newer technologies. The CTO of Com pany C 
pointed out  that  there are excellent  technologies available to support  social 
networking and collaborat ion. However, this was of no value if there was no dem and 
for the technology and num ber of people collaborat ing was none. I ndicat ive of all the 
firm s, the COO of Com pany A explicit ly stated that  the technology was “way ahead of 
the m arket ” .  However, instead of j ust  staying away from  new technologies, the post -
2002 firm s took it  upon them selves to “educate the m arket ” (CTO, Com pany F) . I n 
addit ion, Com pany E used new business m odels to drive the adopt ion of their new 
eLearning product . 
 
Table 5 : Data dem onstrat ing that  technology supply in the eLearning 
industry did not  m eet  the dem and of both types of firm s. 
Quote I nterviewee Com pany 
Sem ant ic web and stuff….. yea, we don’t  see the value 
in it  yet  as custom ers haven’t  asked for it .    COO 
Com pany D 
Pre-2002 
“Wisdom  of crowds is useless if you’re the only one 
there”  CTO 
Com pany B 
Pre-2002 
“There is all the great  stuff that  we can do for  
custom ers, m ult iple ways of delivering content ,  if wake 
up in the m orning and decide to take the t rain to work 
they can get  it  on their  phone and when they get  into 
the office they can carry on with their PC. But  from  m y 
point  of view is who is going to pay for the ext ra 
layers”  CTO 
Com pany C 
Pre-2002 
“The technology is way ahead of what  the m arket  can 
bare and what  the m arket  will pay for and we have to 
run a business and the business is a slave to the 
m arket .” COO 
Com pany A 
Pre-2002 
“I  find m yself educat ing the m arket ” CTO 
Com pany F 
Post -2002 
“we are evangelising, going out  get t ing in front  of 
users, t elling them  what  you do.” COO 
Com pany E 
Post -2002 
 
Sum m ary of findings 
   Sum m arising the applicabilit y of the innovators dilem m a to the SME’s in the study, 
Table 6 dem onst rates that  the pre-2002 firm s were caught  in the dilem m a. 
Moreover,  in the case of the pre-2002 firm s, their inabilit y to handle m edium  to long-
term  risks placed st rong rest r ict ions on their abilit y to reduce their dependence on 
current  custom ers and invest  in Web 2.0 innovat ions. Highlighted in Table 6, only 
two of the principles could be adequately applied to the post -2002 firm s. However, 
their abilit y to create a clear vision and the realisat ion of their role in educat ing the 
m arket  helped the firm s overcom e the negat ive consequences of the principles. This 
abilit y to create a vision was clearly lacking in the pre-2002 firm s. I n addit ion, Table 
6 also highlights the reasons why principles 1, 2 and 4 did not  apply to the 
organisat ions. 
 
Table 6 : Sum m ary of the applicability of the I nnovators Dilem m a to the pre  
and post - 2 0 0 2  f irm s 
 Principles of the Innovators Dilem m a 
 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 
Pre-
2002 Applied Applied Applied Applied Applied 
Post -
2002 
Did not  apply 
as ( i)  the 
organisat ions 
were building a 
custom er base, 
and ( ii)  due to 
the novelty of 
their products 
had m inim al 
input  from  
custom ers. 
Did not  apply as 
( i)  the firm s 
were in an early 
growth stage and 
the sm all 
m arkets were 
sufficient , ( ii)  
venture capital 
enabled the firm s 
to build up sm all 
m arkets 
Applied Did not  apply 
as the 
capabilit ies of 












   Christensen specifically focuses on large and successful organisat ions in his 
research to highlight  the discont inuous nature of disrupt ive innovat ions. I n doing so, 
he highlights that  one of the causes of innovat ion inert ia is the size of the 
organisat ion, but  fails to analyse any organisat ion falling within the SME 
categorisat ion. For instance, principle two of the innovators dilem m a states that  
“sm all m arkets don’t  solve the growth needs of large organisat ions”. However, 
evidence from  our findings dem onst rates that  all five principles of the innovators 
dilem m a apply to SME’s just  as they apply to large organisat ions in the face of 
disrupt ive innovat ions. I n part icular, it  was found that  the dilem m a only applied to 
the pre-2002 firm s. This is inline with the dilem m a and further em phasises the 
relevance of the paradox to incum bent  or established firm s in com parison to start -
ups or new m arket  ent rants. However, the issue of r isk and the r isk profile of firm s 
played a m uch bigger role than was docum ented by Christensen. This would support  
research that  shows a posit ive link between resource availabilit y and r isk- taking, 
which in- turn im pacts the innovat iveness of an organisat ion (Ent rialgo et  al. ,  2001) . 
 
   The findings also highlighted that  the post -2002 firm s were able to avoid the 
negat ive effects of principle 3 (m arkets that  don’t  exist  cannot  be analysed)  by 
creat ing a clear vision of potent ial opportunit ies in the indust ry and by working 
towards m aking those visions a realit y. This was done by both post -2002 firm s as 
they went  about  evangelising and educat ing the m arket . These findings bring further 
light  to bear on how “visionary leadership that  em braces change”  (Tellis, 2006) , can 
be used to m anage the disrupt ive paradox.  
 
   Overall, the study shows that  SME’s are not  different  from  large business units 
(Lubatkin et  al. ,  2006)  in their need to overcom e organisat ional and innovat ion 
challenges. This further suggests that  SME’s are just  as suscept ible to innovat ion 
inert ia and disrupt ive technologies as large organisat ions and also forges a link 
between the general corpus on innovat ion and literature on SME innovat ion, which is 
current ly lacking in research (Edwards et  al. ,  2005) . 
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